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Amy Bresnen1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The State of Texas imposes a broad array of regulations, 
overseeing everything from its massive oil and gas industry2 to the 
application of eyelash extensions.3 The field includes ethics 
regulations governing politicians, lobbyists and other actors in state 
and local politics. Although most if not all law schools offer courses 
in administrative law, there are very few textbooks that specifically 
address Texas Administrative Law or any state’s administrative law. 
This is intriguing because the federal Administrative Procedure Act4 
does not govern state agencies, although there are clear similarities. A 
state’s own administrative procedure laws control state agency 
actions, notwithstanding the manner in which the federal act would 
address a given issue. 
Many disputes within the regulatory system are resolved through 
contested case proceedings in connection with ratemaking, licensing, 
permitting and other means of executive branch enforcement of 
statutes and rules, including Texas ethics laws. The Texas 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines a contested case as “a 
proceeding, including a ratemaking or licensing proceeding, in which 
the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are to be determined by 
a state agency after an opportunity for adjudicative hearing.”5 The 
outcome of a contested case proceeding may be subject to judicial 
review, a critical component of due process, should an affected party 
wish to appeal that decision. 
                                                          
1 Amy Bresnen is a May 2015 J.D. Candidate at St. Mary’s University School of Law 
in San Antonio, Texas. This paper was written for partial fulfillment in a course in 
Administrative Law under the supervision of Professor John W. Teeter. 
2 See TEX. CONST. art. X, § 2; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 30 (Creation of the 
Railroad Commission of Texas). 
3 See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1602.002(C)(12) (stating the application of 
eyelash extensions is included in the definition of ‘Cosmetology’ for regulation 
purposes). 
4 See generally The Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) 
(improving the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative 
procedures federally). 
5 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.003(1) (West, 2013). 
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The general purpose of this paper is to provide law students and 
young lawyers with an overview for accessing, in the context of 
Texas agencies, these legislatively-delegated adjudicative, or quasi-
judicial, powers and explain how agency contested case decisions are 
reviewed by the courts. This is important for lawyers to understand in 
representing a client, be it an individual or entity, whose interests are 
affected by administrative proceedings within regulatory agencies. 
To accomplish this goal, the paper discusses the two most common 
methods of judicial review and contrasts the standard proceedings for 
contested cases at the State Office of Administrative Hearings6 
(SOAH) with those of the Texas Ethics Commission7 (TEC or 
“Commission”). Describing the two agencies’ governance, 
jurisdiction, and overall purposes will provide insight into how 
agencies use administrative and judicial resources while dealing with 
different subject matters and employing substantially different 
procedures for contested cases. 
Concerns regarding due process, separation of powers, and the 
efficient use of both judicial and administrative resources provide the 
foundation for considering how an agency should execute contested 
case proceedings and what type of judicial review is appropriate for 
contested case decisions. But, these issues take on a heightened 
interest when the regulatory state impinges upon First Amendment 
rights. Thus the paper will also examine questions regarding the 
standard lawmakers have chosen for judicial review of their 
compliance with Texas ethics laws versus the standard lawmakers 
have applied to other regulated activities. As will be seen, lawmakers 
have “concentrated wonderfully” on the issue—and made their choice 
quite explicit. 
The TEC has jurisdiction over matters that directly affect First 
Amendment activities, enforcing statutes intended to balance the 
protection of such activities with concerns about public corruption and 
the public’s right to certain information about the conduct of public 
affairs. Furthermore, the issues the TEC addresses are at the heart of 
important current debates about how our political system should 
function.8 Recent headline-making cases at the TEC9 have underlined 
                                                          
6 See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2003.01-2003.914. 
7 See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 571.01-571.177. 
8 See e.g., Texas Ethics Commission, Proposed Rule 20.68 (Tex. 2014), 
http://ethics.state.tx.us/rules/proposed_Feb_2014.html. (regarding disclosure of 
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the importance of differences between the typical administrative 
procedure for contested cases employed by SOAH and those of the 
TEC. Therefore, it is appropriate to discuss the differences between 
the two agencies’ treatment of contested cases while evaluating 
whether due process, separation of powers, and the efficient use of 
administrative and judicial resources are given adequate 
consideration. 
Although judicial review follows the application of agencies’ 
contested case procedures, the paper will start with a review of the 
two most common standards of judicial review— substantial 
evidence and de novo—because in many ways an agency’s contested 
case processes foreshadow the means of judicial review. It is 
necessary to address some Texas history, including the most recent 
regular legislative session, concerning judicial review of agency 
decisions in order to grasp the policies that determine when and how 
these two types of judicial review are employed. Both SOAH and 
TEC employ, to one extent or another, the Texas APA provisions 
relating to fact-finding in contested cases, which makes it appropriate 
to briefly discuss how the APA applies the Texas Rules of Evidence 
(TRE) in the proceedings. 
Generally speaking, one must assess the relevant provisions of 
the APA and the enabling statutes and administrative rules of both 
SOAH and each applicable regulatory agency to determine how a 
contested case proceeding will be conducted in any given situation. 
Once it is determined that an issue is reviewable, it is necessary to 
consider the type of review authorized by the agency’s enabling 
statutes. Because a lawyer earns her fee partly by predicting the 
likelihood of success for her client in pursuing an appeal at the more 
expensive level of judicial review, it is important for a lawyer to 
gauge the degree of deference a court will give to an agency’s 
decision. 
                                                          
campaign contributions, note: the proposed rule is now dead due to agency 
inaction). 
9 See David Saleh Rauf, Activist Fined $10,000 for Not Registering as Lobbyist 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE  (July 21, 2014), 
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/politics/texas/article/Activist-fined-10-000-
for-not-registering-as-5636511.php; see also John Council, Group Seeks to Remove 
Abbott from Hecht Case TEXAS LAWYER (October 21, 2014), 
http://www.texaslawyer.com/home/id=1202674131082/Group-Seeks-to-Remove-
Abbott-from-Hecht-Fine-Case?mcode=1202616608548&curindex=4. 
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II.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTESTED CASES 
 
There are, generally speaking, two types of judicial review of 
agency contested-case decisions employed by courts. The principle 
differences are often described in terms of judicial deference to 
agency decision-making, but also entail variances in procedure on 
appeal. If the agency’s enabling statute authorizes trial de novo, in 
some ways it can be said that there is no review.10 The court simply 
substitutes judicial processes in all respects for those of the agency 
and gives no deference to the agency’s decision.11 If the statute does 
not mandate de novo review, the review will be based on the 
agency’s record developed during the contested case.12 This standard 
is usually referred to as the “substantial evidence” rule and gives 
significant deference to the agency’s decision.13 If there is substantial 
evidence to support the agency’s determination of the facts, a court 
will not second guess the agency or re-weigh the evidence.14 
 
A.   De Novo Review 
 
Before the New Deal, federal courts often required de novo 
appeals of state and federal agency decisions.15 However, as the 
number of regulatory agencies grew, the number of cases appealing 
agency decisions in courts also grew.16 This proved burdensome on 
judicial resources and efficiency.17 Some federal courts began to 
                                                          
10 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 423 (2d Cir. 2004). 
11 Id. 
12 Hawkins v. Cmty. Health Choice, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Tex. App. 
2004). 
13 Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 
953, 955 (Tex. 1984). 
14 Id. 
15 For a general discussion on federal and Texas history of de novo judicial 
review, see Pieter M. Schenkkan, When and How Should Texas Courts Review 
Agency Rules, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 989 (1995). 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
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withdraw under the banner of the abstention doctrine;18 others relied 
on a newly developed alternative de novo review written by the 
United States Supreme Court and Congress.19 Nonetheless, it was 
clear that the Court still had misgivings about giving up de novo 
review.20 The new de novo review went only half way to 
abandonment, stating that Congress could not constitutionally 
withdraw from the courts the final determination of those facts upon 
which constitutional rights or the agency’s jurisdiction depend.21 The 
majority emphasized this rule by indicating that to allow final agency 
determination of such constitutional and jurisdictional facts would be 
to “sap the judicial power” and “establish a government of a 
bureaucratic character alien to our system.”22 Justice Brandeis, 
dissenting, argued that the rule would “gravely hamper the effective 
administration” of an agency’s statutory responsibilities.23  
As New Deal economic and political crises continued, appeals of 
agency decisions also continued to congest the court system. 
Congress began testing the Court’s commitment to the slightly 
                                                          
18 For a recent discussion on the “abstention” doctrine, see Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger abstention requires that federal courts decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over lawsuits when three conditions are met: (1) the federal 
proceeding would interfere with “an ongoing state judicial proceeding;” (2) the 
state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) 
the plaintiff has “an adequate opportunity to the state proceedings to raise 
constitutional challenges.” See also Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 
S.Ct. 584, 591 (2013) (clarifying that abstention should be exercised only in three 
types of state judicial proceedings such as ‘civil enforcement proceedings’ 
involving important state interests, quasi-criminal proceedings, and in proceedings 
where the state itself is usually a party). State administrative proceeding appeals 
would seem to fit this description. See Empower Texans, Inc. v. Texas Ethics 
Comm’n, 2014 WL 1666389 (W.D. Tex.) (holding that under the Younger 
abstention doctrine, plaintiff could seek legal remedy in a state court rather than 
federal court). 
19 See generally Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (ruling that so long as 
courts retained the power to make independent determinations of constitutional or 
jurisdictional facts, Congress could without violation of separation of powers 
bestow judicial power to adjudicate workmen’s compensation awards upon an 
administrative agency). 
20 See id. 
21 Id. at 64. 
22 Id. at 57. 
23 Id. at 85-88, 94. 
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diluted de novo judicial review approach by conferring on agencies 
the power to decide all fact issues, subject only to review for 
substantial evidence on the agency record. The Court quietly 
surrendered.24 In 1946, Congress passed the Administrative 
Procedure Act, which declared that the scope of judicial review for 
federal agency decisions would be limited to the agency record, and 
the standard would be whether the fact findings were “unsupported 
by substantial evidence” when the courts reviewed the “whole 
record.”25  
Back in Texas, plaintiffs were left with the question of whether 
they could still rely on their state courts to use de novo review when 
hearing appeals to agency decisions. Austin, unlike Washington, had 
not yet become captivated with systematic and orderly governance. 
Austin was a very small town26 and agency commissioners relied 
heavily on information and views solicited outside an administrative 
hearing.27 Most Austin government lawyers and law professors 
scoffed at any judicial review that deviated from de novo review.28 It 
was well known in the political community that decisions were made 
in bruising, arm-twisting political brawls; it was simply inevitable.29 
Therefore, plaintiffs needed a neutral and apolitical place to freshly 
litigate the facts and relevant law pertaining to their contested cases, 
such as a court of law.  
Until the 1960s, those in the legislature favoring de novo review 
had the upper hand.30 But, the Texas Supreme Court continuously 
construed the statutes to mean “substantial evidence” and wrote that 
if the legislature wanted review by trial de novo, it could have said 
                                                          
24 See id. 
25 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231, 1231-32 (1994). 
26 The 1940 population of Austin was 87,930. AUSTIN TEXAS GOV, 
https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Planning/Demographics/po
pulation_history_pub.pdf  (last visited October 8, 2014). 
27 Perry O. Barber, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action—A 
Need for Texas Reform?, 40 TEX. L. REV. 992, 996 (1962). 
28 Various syllabi and examination records from the University of 
Texas School of Law administrative class are on file with the Tarleton 
Law Library in Austin, Texas. 
29 Barber, supra note 29 at 1004. 
30 Id. at 1007.  
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so, but it would be ill advised.31 The legislature passed statute after 
statute, clarifying that it plainly and unequivocally meant de novo 
judicial review.32 Finally, the legislature found words that no court 
could possibly misconstrue. In response, the Texas Supreme Court 
finally said what it meant and declared “de novo judicial review of . . 
. [agency] decision[s] would clearly involve the exercise by the 
courts of nonjudicial powers” reversing its 1897 and 1903 
precedents.33 Legislative or public policy decisions “cannot be 
lawfully delegated directly to the judiciary by the Legislature”34 
without violating separation of powers; likewise, they “cannot be 
conferred upon the courts by means of a de novo trial after an 
administrative hearing.”35 The legislature then took the issue to the 
Texas voters in 1961 by placing a proposition on the ballot, which, if 
passed, would become a state constitutional amendment authorizing 
the legislature to confer that power on the courts.36 The proposition 
failed.37  
 
B.  Substantial Evidence Review 
 
Once a referring agency has given notice to the respondent of its 
decision relating to a contested case, the respondent may appeal that 
decision in district court.38 Unless the agency’s enabling statutes 
dictate otherwise, the respondent will be restricted to a district in court 
in Travis County.39 If an agency’s own statutes do not prescribe a 
type of judicial review for the reviewing court, the court will use the 
“substantial evidence rule” to decide the appeal of a contested case.40 
                                                          
31 S. Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Engineers, 318 S.W.2d 619, 625 (1958). 
32 Barber, at 1007-08. 
33 Key Western Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Ins., 350 S.W. 2d 839, 848 
(1961), (citing Davis v. City of Lubbock, 326 S.W. 2d 699, 714 (1959)). 
34 See Key Western Life Ins. Co, 350 S.W. 2d. at 847. 
35 Id. 
36 Barber, supra note 29, at 1007-08. 
37 Barber, supra note 29, at 1008. 
38 TEX GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2001.175-2001.176(b)(1) (West 2015). 
39 TEX GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.176(b)(1) (West 2015); Tex. Dep’t of Prot. 
& Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W. 3d 170 (Tex. 2002). 
40 Tex. Dep’t of Prot. & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W. 
3d 170, 183 (Tex. 2002). 
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Under the substantial evidence rule, a reviewing court may not 
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency on the weight 
of the evidence on questions committed to agency discretion.41 The 
evidence may even preponderate against the agency’s finding, but the 
court must still uphold the finding if enough evidence suggests that 
the agency’s decision was reasonable under the circumstances.42 The 
issue is not whether the agency reached the correct conclusion, but 
whether the agency’s decision was, in fact, reasonable.  
Substantial evidence, in essence, means more than a scintilla.43 
The relevant evidence is such that “a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion.”44 The court reviews the record 
as a whole, including opposing evidence offered during the agency’s 
formal hearing.45 When taken as a whole, the evidence must do more 
than a create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be 
established.46 
Although the primary difference between de novo and substantial 
evidence review is whether the court tries the case all over again, it 
should be noted that the APA does allow, under limited 
circumstances, for the introduction of new evidence in an appeal 
based on substantial evidence review.47 Section 2001.175(c), 
Government Code, provides:  
(c) A party may apply to the court to present 
additional evidence. If the court is 
satisfied that the additional evidence is material 
and that there were good reasons for the failure to 
present it in the proceeding before the state agency, 
the court may order that the additional evidence be 
taken before the agency on conditions determined by 
                                                          
41 Tex GOV’T CODE ANN § 2001.174. 
42 See id; § 2001.174(2)(E). 
43 For a general discussion on the “substantial evidence rule,” see James R. 
Eissinger, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact in Contested Cases under APTRA, 
42 BAYLOR L. REV.1 (Winter 1990); See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
305 U.S. 197 (1939) (holding that such evidence is what a reasonable mind might 
consider to as adequate to support a conclusion). 
44 See Essinger, supra note 45 at 38. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See Tex GOV’T CODE ANN § 2001.175(c). 
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the court. The agency may change its findings and 
decision by reason of the additional evidence and shall 
file the additional evidence and any changes, new 
findings, or decisions with the reviewing court.48 
The quality of the evidence, quantity of the evidence, and the 
rules of evidence are major influences in Texas in determining 
whether the substantial evidence test has been satisfied.49 The APA 
establishes a basic format for “fact” review by stating that findings, 
inferences, conclusions or decisions must be reasonably supported by 
substantial evidence looking at “reliable and probative evidence in 
the record as a whole.”50 The “administrative findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions” may not be “arbitrary” or “capricious.”51 If 
this standard has been met, the reviewing court should not reverse 
and render or reverse and remand the action.52 But even if the action 
is not supported by that standard, the APA requires that “substantial 
rights” be “prejudiced” before a reversal or remand is justified.53 
Although this standard of review is highly deferential to agency 
decision-making powers, there have been many occasions when the 
agency has failed to meet its light burden.54 One obvious scenario 
illustrating when a court may limit agency action would be where the 
agency engaged in illegal conduct. In City of Stephenville v. Texas 
Parks and Wildlife Department, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
applicants, whose water permits were granted by the Water 
Commission, participated in bribery and improper influence.55 The 
trial court agreed that the Commission engaged in bribery and also 
violated the Open Meetings Act.56 The court reversed the 
                                                          
48 Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.175 (West 2015). 
49 See R. Pierce, S. Shapiro & P. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process § 
7.3.1 (1985). 
50 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2)(E) (West 2015). 
51 See id. § 2001.174(2)(F). 
52 See id. 
53 See id. §2001.174(2). 
54 See City of Stephenville v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 940 S.W.2d 667 
(Tex. App. 1996), writ denied (June 12, 1997). 
55 Id. at 671. 
56 Id. at 680. 
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Commission’s decision and ordered that the applicants be required to 
re-file their permit application.57  
The court may also circumscribe the agency’s authority to impose 
certain sanctions when the sanctions are believed to be beyond the 
agency’s authority.58 In such cases, the court may uphold the 
agency’s decision but reverse the penalty and remand to the agency 
to enter a new order.59 
Lack of quality or quantity in the evidence may move a reviewing 
court to more closely examine the legal basis of an agency decision.60 
Also, illegally obtained evidence may be enough to require a higher 
standard of review.61 Evidence of failure to meet professional 
standards is not considered substantial in the absence of expert 
testimony when considering the individual’s professional conduct, 
despite the individuals sitting on the board being professionals with 
knowledge of the standards.62 The board’s testimony must be stated 
in the record; the court cannot be asked to read the minds of the 
expert board. The evidence must be known and the adverse party 
should be afforded the right to rebut it.63  
Case law reveals that one of the chief concerns of Texas courts 
when faced with contested cases on appeal is the Texas constitutional 
provision on separation of powers.64 Unlike the federal Constitution 
where it is merely implied that there is a separation of powers, the 
Texas Constitution expressly forbids the combination of functions or 
                                                          
57 940 S.W.2d 667, 678-79 (Tex. App. 1996). 
58 See Freightliner Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Bd. Of Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 255 
S.W. 3d 356 (Tex. App. 2008). 
59 See id. 
60 See Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Gross, 712 S.W. 2d 639 
(Tex. App. 1986) (holding that a doctor’s present qualification controlled, and 
therefore the record lacked the substantial evidence necessary to deny the 
doctor’s requested transfer). 
61 Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Guice, 704 S.W. 2d 113 (Tex. App. 
1986) (holding that a doctor, caught with illegal drugs, was worthy of a separate 
proceeding as to whether his rights were violated after the doctor alleged he had been 
entrapped.) 
62 See id. 
63 See Dotson v. Texas State Bd. Of Medical Examiners, 621 S.W.2d 921, 923 
(Tex. 1981). 
64 See City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 564 (Tex. 2012). 
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any one department exercising the powers of any other department.65 
Where the issue is not related to a constitutional taking or other right 
allegedly violated by a state agency, courts will defer to the agency 
and not usurp its power to issue decisions in contested cases.66 This 
rule is illustrated in Gerst v. Nixon, where the Supreme Court held 
the legislature cannot grant the courts the power to issue charters, 
permits, or certificates because they are administrative functions.67 If 
substantial evidence supports the agency decision, then the judicial 
inquiry is satisfied.68  
Even losing a professional or occupational license, which has 
long been considered a serious matter and subject to the constraints 
of due process, may be subject to the substantial evidence rule.69 In 
Texas Board of Dental Examiners v. Sizemore,70 a dentist complained 
of lack of substantial evidence to revoke his dental license. The 
evidence consisted of unnecessary prescriptions of Percodan 
(Oxycodone-Aspirin) and Tylox (Oxycodone-acetaminophen) to 
some patients and the dentist failed to keep proper records.71 
Although reasonable persons could differ as to the quantum of 
evidence, the Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to 
satisfy the substantial evidence standard.72 The Court stated, 
“Traditionally higher standards are not demanded because of more 
serious consequences; there is but one substantial evidence rule.”73 
 
 
                                                          
65 TEX. CONST. art. II, §1; City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W. 3d 562, 573-74 
(Tex. 2012). 
66 See Gerst v. Nixon, 411 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1966). 
67 Id. at 360. 
68 411 S.W. 2d 350 (Tex. 1966). 
69 See Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d 114, 118 
(Tex. 1988). 
70 759 S.W. 2d 114 (Tex. 1988). 
71 Id. at 116. 
72 Id. 
73 James R. Eissinger, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact in Contested Cases 
Under Aptra, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 45 (1990); see also NLRB v. Walton Mfg. 
Co., 369 U.S. 404, 407 (1962) (per curiam) (“There is no place in the statutory 
scheme for one test of substantiality of evidence in reinstatement cases and another 
test in other cases.”). Id. 
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III.  THE STATE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 
 
In 1986, the Texas House of Representatives commissioned a 
study on the advantages and disadvantages of creating a central 
panel of administrative law judges.74 The study was mainly 
concerned with the perception of unfairness due to regulatory 
agency employees overseeing their agency’s contested cases.75 The 
hearing officers may have already formed an opinion or bias against 
the respondent by the time a final agency decision was to be made. 
The study alluded to potential procedural due process problems and 
the need to protect those who deal with state agencies from arbitrary 
and unwise action.76 The report concluded that an independent 
hearing officer system would introduce and ensure minimum 
standards of due process.77 However, the report did not assert the 
need to completely remove decision-making power from the agency 
or restrict the agency from reversing the independent hearing officer 
system’s decision only upon reversible error.78 The report still found 
it critical to the overall workings of administrative agencies that the 
ultimate decision be determined by the respective regulatory 
agency.79 
In 1991, the Legislature responded to these findings by creating 
SOAH to be “comprised of ‘independent’ hearing officers to be 
utilized by all state agencies that did not employ at least one individual 
whose only duty was to preside as a hearing officer over contested 
cases” to SOAH.80 Although there is no federal agency similar to 
                                                          
74 For a discussion on SOAH’s creation and history, see Ron Beal, The Texas 
State Office of Administrative Hearings: Establishing Independent Adjudicators in 
Contested Case Proceedings While Preserving the Power of Institutional Decision-
Making, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 119 (Spring 2005); Report on the 
Advantages and Disadvantages to the State Creating a Central Panel of 
Administrative Law Judges Before the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. 69th Leg. 
Sess. (Tex. 1986) [hereinafter “House Report”]. 
75 House Report at 98. 
76 Id. at 81-83. 
77 Id. at 98. 
78 See id. 
79 Id. at 83-100. 
80 Ron Beal, The Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings: Establishing 
Independent Adjudicators in Contested Case Proceedings While Preserving the 
Power of Institutional Decision-Making, 25 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judges. 
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SOAH, several states have comparable central hearing panels or 
agencies.81 
 
A.  Structure of SOAH 
 
SOAH does not have a board or commission that governs its 
operation. The Chief Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter 
referred to as ALJ), appointed by the Governor and confirmed by 
the Texas Senate, is the head of the agency and responsible for its 
daily operations.82 SOAH ALJs preside in hearings covering a wide 
variety of subjects, including professional and vocational licensing 
and regulation, workers’ compensation healthcare provider 
reimbursements, teacher and state employee benefits, financial and 
utility regulation, payment of taxes owed to the state and counties, 
and environmental and natural resources issues.83  
The judges are directly accountable to the chief administrative 
law judge and not subject to the direct or indirect influence of a 
referring agency.84 This independence from outside influence is 
insured by the APA, since ex parte communications between a 
member or employee of a state agency who is assigned to render a 
decision or to make findings of facts and conclusions of law in a 
contested case and any person, party, state agency or representative 
of those entities is prohibited.85 
 
B.  Duties and Legislative Delegation of Authority 
 
The purpose of SOAH is to separate the adjudicative function 
from the investigative, prosecutorial, and policy-making functions 
                                                          
(2005) 
available at http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol25/iss1/3. 
81 SOAH Self-Evaluation Rep. (2013), H.R. 591, § 1, 72nd Leg. 
Sess.(Tx.1991).https://www.sunset.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/reports/
State%20Office%20of%20Administrative%20Hearings%20SER%20201
3%2084%20Leg.pdf.  
82 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2003.022(d) (West 2013). 
83 SOAH Self-Evaluation Rep., supra note 82 at 3. 
84 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2003.022(a). 
85 Id. § 2001.061(a). 
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exercised by regulatory agencies.86 For too long, administrative 
hearings involving state agencies were subject to charges of conflicts 
of interest because hearing examiners were often employed by the 
agency involved in the case before them.87 In other words, SOAH 
exists solely to conduct contested case hearings and mediations; it 
does not have any other responsibilities. Its jurisdiction over agency 
contested cases was further bolstered by a 1993 Texas attorney 
general opinion that held an agency could not forego the services of 
a SOAH ALJ by a quorum of the members sitting as presiding 
officer at a contested hearing case.88 
The Self-Evaluation Report explains: 
During FY2012, SOAH provided services to 
[forty-nine] state agencies. The number of cases 
handled for each agency varies widely. There are also 
one or more non-state parties involved in each case. 
These include individuals, corporations, local 
governments, and other entities. SOAH conducts 
hearings only in cases referred to it by state agencies 
or local government entities.89  
Although the TEC may bring a contested case to SOAH, there is 
no indication that this has ever occurred since at least 2008.90 
 
C.  SOAH Contested Case Process 
 
Unlike the TEC, private parties may not file cases with SOAH 
although cases can be referred to SOAH by a state agency on a 
request for a hearing submitted to the agency by a private party.91 An 
agency may commence the case itself or file the appropriate 
                                                          
86 Id. §§ 2003.021(b)(1)-(2), (b) (4). 
87 See R. Pierce, S. Shapiro & P. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process § 
7.3.1 (1985). 
88 Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. DM-231 (1993) (holding that an agency could not 
forego the services of an SOAH ALJ by a quorum of the members sitting as the 
presiding officer at a contested case hearing and the legislative intent was to create 
an administrative judiciary independent of the agency who could objectively hear 
administrative disputes). (emphasis added). 
89 SOAH Self-Evaluation Rep., supra note 82, at 33-35. 
90 See id. at Exhibit 2, 3 (Note omission of TEC); § 571. 121. 
91 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 155.7(a), 155.9(a)-(f) (2004) 
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pleadings and forms with SOAH in order to immediately grant 
SOAH jurisdiction over the case.92 Once the case is sent to SOAH, it 
will be assigned to an ALJ.93 The ALJ is required to abide by 
applicable provisions in the APA and the referring agency’s 
procedural rules.94 If the referring agency does not have rules for its 
contested cases or if an agency does not have a rule on a specific 
issue, SOAH will simply, in whole or in part, substitute its own 
procedural rules as is necessary to address all of the issues in a 
proceeding.95  
Once the case is in SOAH’s jurisdiction, the ALJ has authority to 
oversee discovery,96 hold pre-hearing conferences with the parties,97 
issue subpoenas,98 or refer the case to a mediated settlement 
conference or other appropriate alternative dispute resolution 
procedures.99 An ALJ may also impose sanctions against a party or 
its representative for groundless motions, unnecessary delay, failure 
to obey an applicable rule, disallowing further discovery, and other 
violations that would impede a fair and impartial hearing.100 At the 
conclusion of testimony, an ALJ can request that the parties submit 
legal memoranda on disputed issues and prepare and submit 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.101  
As to issues of fact, a finding may be inferred only by 
determination that the evidence preponderates in favor of its 
existence.102 Generally, evidence is improperly admitted if its 
admission would violate a specific evidence rule.103 The APA 
provides that an objection may be made, but in order to preserve 
                                                          
92 Id. §§ 155.7 (b)-(c). 
93 TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2003.041 (West). 
94 Id. 
95 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2003.050(a)-(b) (West 2013). 
96 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 155.29 (e)-(f), 155.31(g), (i)-(m), 155.56, 155.57 
(2013). 
97 Id. § 155.33(a). 
98 Id. § 155.31(e). 
99 Id. § 155.33(d). 
100 TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2003.041 (West). 
101 See generally 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 155.15-60. 
102 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 155.505 (2013). 
103 See Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. V. Travelers Ins. Co., 587 S.W. 2d 501, 
505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979), writ denied NRE (1979). 
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error, a party must make a timely objection, specify the evidence rule 
violated by the admission, and obtain an adverse ruling on its 
objection.104  
According to the APA, the State’s evidence rules relating to 
“nonjury” civil cases apply to the formal hearing.105 This application 
can be confusing because the evidence rules have been codified and 
include no rules specified to civil nonjury trials.106 Many, if not most, 
of the evidentiary concerns addressed are important only to jury 
trials.107 For example, Texas Rules of Evidence (TRE)  403 allows 
for exclusion of relevant evidence if the danger that it may lead to 
irrational or incorrect fact-finding by jurors substantially outweighs 
its probative value.108 This rule may be an issue, for example, when a 
party wants to introduce an autopsy or graphic pictures into 
evidence.109 An admission of such striking detail might leave jurors 
in shock and unable to concentrate on other relevant exhibits of 
evidence.  However, in a formal hearing for a contested case, there 
are no jurors present.110 If an objection were made based on TRE 
403, it would not preserve error.111 The only possible way to preserve 
error based on TRE 403 is by arguing, for example, against the 
admission of “unduly repetitious” evidence as the rule’s proscription 
against delay or cumulative evidence that may interfere with the 
presiding officers’ ability to truly consider other evidence.112  
A more serious consequence of the APA’s adoption of nonjury 
rules of evidence is that it expands the scope of admissible evidence. 
                                                          
104 See TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); TEX R. APP. P. 33.1. 
105 For a general discussion on the APA’s treatment of the Texas Rules of 
Evidence, see Chris Funderburg, Evidence Law at SOAH, 10 TEX. TECH. 
ADMIN. L.J. 423 (Spring 2009); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.001(1) (West 
2013). 
106 See W. Jeremy Counseller, Professor, Baylor University School of 
Law, Judicial Review of Evidentiary Decisions in Contested Case 
Hearings, in Advanced Administrative Law Course 1, 2-3 (2006). 
107 See id. 
108 TEX. R. EVID. 403. 
109 See id. 
110 See Vaughn v. Johnson, No. 7:98-CV-005-R, 2001 WL 912657, at *7 (N.D. 
Tex. Aug. 7, 2001). 
111 See id. 
112 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.082 (West 2013). 
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There is essentially an “escape clause” created in the APA that allows 
evidence that would be inadmissible under the rules of evidence.113 
For example, the APA allows evidence that would otherwise be 
inadmissible under those rules if deemed “necessary to ascertain facts 
not reasonably susceptible of proof,” or are not precluded by statute, 
or evidence upon which a “reasonably prudent person” would rely.114 
Arguably, this provision allows for hearsay evidence not otherwise 
excepted from the TRE’s hearsay prohibition.115 
Unless hearsay evidence fits into an exception described in the 
rules of evidence, a proper objection should exclude it from 
admission.116 The premise behind this exclusion is to prevent 
unreliable evidence from being reflected in the record.117 Its 
admission may otherwise create an unacceptable risk that jurors will 
confuse it with reliable evidence and then predicate incorrect verdicts 
on it.118 Exclusion of hearsay evidence is gravely important to the 
court system because this type of evidence—though unreliable—is 
often probative, and might therefore tempt jurors to consider it..119  
Texas cases interpreting the escape clause support the view that the 
APA permits admission of un-excepted hearsay.120 However, the 
evidence cannot be immaterial or irrelevant or unduly repetitious.121 
Federal and state court decisions suggest that certain circumstances 
may be sufficient indicia of un-excepted hearsay evidence’s 
reliability if: 1) the declarant’s name and occupation are disclosed (if 
                                                          
113 See W. Jeremy Counseller, Professor, Baylor University School of Law, 
Judicial Review of Evidentiary Decisions in Contested Case Hearings, in Advanced 
Administrative Law Course 1, 2-3 (2006). 
114 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.081. 
115 See W. Jeremy Counseller, Professor, Baylor University School of Law, 
Judicial Review of Evidentiary Decisions in Contested Case Hearings, in Advanced 
Administrative Law Course 1, 2-3 (2006). 
116 TEX. R. EVID. 802-804. 
117 See W. Jeremy Counseller, Professor, Baylor University School of Law, 
Judicial Review of Evidentiary Decisions in Contested Case Hearings, in Advanced 
Administrative Law Course 1, 2-3 (2006). 
118 See DePasquale v. Harrington, 599 A.2d 314, 316 (R.I. 1991). 
119 See id., 599 A.2d. at 316. 
120 See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Kimbrough, 106 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Tex. 
App. 2003); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Smith, No. 05-95-01158-CV, 1997 Tex. 
App. LEXIS 2421, at *6 n. 4 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 5, 1997). 
121 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § (West 2013); TEX. R. EVID. 401. 
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relevant);122 2) the declarant appears to be impartial, unbiased, and 
truthful;123 3) other admissible evidence supports the hearsay 
evidence and little probative evidence contradicts it;124 4) indications 
that the declarant is widely respected in the field or a source widely 
used in the field; 5) the evidence is not conclusory but is based on the 
relevant personal knowledge of the declarant and derived from 
procedures accepted in the field;125 and finally, 6) indications that the 
hearsay evidence would fit within an accepted hearsay exception but 
for minor (i.e., not substantive) inconsistencies with the exception.126  
The escape clause emphasizes that reliable un-excepted hearsay 
evidence is admissible to prove a fact only upon a showing that the 
evidence is necessary to ascertain facts that are not reasonably 
susceptible to proof under the nonjury rules of evidence.127 Whether 
these predicates are satisfied depends on whether the proponent of 
the hearsay evidence could obtain other proof to prove the fact and 
the cost of obtaining that other proof.128 If it is determined, for 
example, that the un-excepted evidence is the most probative 
available, it should be admitted, because a fact is not reasonably 
susceptible to proof if its only proof is un-excepted hearsay.129  
Although this relaxed treatment of the rules of evidence may 
baffle some trial attorneys,130 it is important to consider the reason 
                                                          
122 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 403 (1971). 
123 Id. at 393, 403-04. 
124 Nat’l Council of Am.-Soviet Friendship, Inc. v. Subversive Activities 
Control Bd., 322 F.2d 375, 387-88 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
125 Mayhew v. McLeod, C.A. No. 98-1271, 1998 R.I. Super., LEXIS 66, at 
*12 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1998) (confirming the validity of hearsay fishing records by 
their use by the federal government and virtually every state on the east coast 
engaged in fishery regulation). 
126 In re Odessa Corp., 898 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Vt. 2006) (properly excluding 
a written statement about a disputed sale prepared by the store clerk after the fact 
and then introduced as a business record for not meeting exception 
requirements). 
127 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.081 (West 2013). 
128 See id. 
129 C.T.S. Corp. v. Schoulton, 354 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ind. App. 1976). 
130 Compared to military tribunal treatment of the evidence rules, the APA’s 
application of the evidence rules may seem like a rigid adherence. See generally 
David Glazier, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal? Judging the 21st Century 
Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005 (2003). 
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for this treatment. As Justice John Powers noted in his manual for the 
training of Texas ALJs, the rendering of a contested case order is an 
“institutional decision.”131 The administrative process builds on the 
principle that each agency is equipped with “specialists,” much like a 
large medical clinic employs specialists who can often provide 
medical services superior to any individual physician by bringing in 
experts on an agency’s subject matter jurisdiction.132 Therefore, most 
agencies reject the idea of a lay decision-maker or jury trial where a 
strict application of the rules of evidence is necessary, and replace 
that setting with the intelligence and analysis of expertly trained 
personnel.133 
Critics may be offended by such a blurry separation of powers 
and argue that it creates an obstacle to fairness in administrative 
adjudications. But if every contested case were sent directly to a 
district court, the costs of defending the agency’s decisions in court 
would exponentially grow. Put simply, government spending would 
grow due to the inefficient use of administrative and judicial 
resources. 
As to issues of law, the APA provides that a state agency must 
provide the ALJ with a written statement of its applicable policies 
and rules.134 However, the “state agency may not attempt to influence 
the ALJ’s application of the law in a contested case, except by proper 
. . . legal argument.”135  
After analyzing and considering the evidence and legal arguments, 
the ALJ will issue a proposal for decision. The ALJ must base his or 
her findings exclusively on the evidence submitted in the written 
record.136 The parties, however, may still submit any exceptions, 
objections, or other responses to the proposal for decision to SOAH 
and the referring agency, which possesses the final decision-making 
authority.137 The ALJ, even at this point, has the power to review such 
                                                          
131 JOHN E. POWERS, AGENCY ADJUDICATIONS, 84-87 (Tex. A&M Press 1990). 
132 Kenneth C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE, Vol. 1, § 8.6, 551-52 (Aspen Law & Business Co., 4th ed. 2002). 
133 See id. 
 
134 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e)(3) (West 2013). 
135 See id. 
136 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 155.7(a), 155.9 (a)-(f) (2013). 
137 See id. 
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documents and make changes to the original proposal sent to the 
referring agency.138  
 
D.  The Referring Agency is the Final Decision-Maker 
 
Prior to the creation of SOAH and for any current ALJ that is an 
employee of an agency, the ALJ had no power to bind state agencies 
by their proposals for decisions.139 The agency could simply 
disregard with impunity an ALJ’s findings in an agency’s contested 
case.140 After SOAH’s inception, the legislature carefully calibrated a 
referring agency’s final decision-making power by ensuring that the 
SOAH ALJ proposal for decision will be focal point of the agency’s 
analysis in formulating its final order.141 
The APA was modified when SOAH was created to provide that 
if an agency chooses to modify a SOAH ALJ proposal for decision, 
the agency must do so in writing and state the reason and legal basis 
for changing its order.142 In 1997, the legislature sharpened SOAH’s 
ultimate say in the agency’s decision by adding the following: 
(e) A state agency may change a finding of fact 
or conclusion of law made by 
the administrative law judge, or may vacate or 
modify an order issued by the administrative judge, 
only if the agency determines: 
(1) that the administrative law judge did not 
properly apply or interpret applicable law, agency 
rules, written policies provided [to the ALJ by the 
agency] under Subsection (c), or prior administrative 
decisions; 
(2) that a prior administrative decision on which 
the administrative law judge relied is incorrect or 
should be changed; or 
                                                          
138 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(d) (West 2013). 
139 Hunter Indus. Facilities, Inc. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 
910 S.W.2d 96, 102 (Tex. App.1995). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058 (e)(3) (West 2013). 
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(3) that a technical error in a finding of fact should 
be changed.143  
It is clear from the plain reading of the statute that an agency that 
merely follows the APA standard is no longer free to arbitrarily 
substitute its own judgment, including when the agency disagrees 
with how the ALJ weighed the evidence.144 The standard restricts 
reversal of a finding of fact to “technical issues” only.145 “Technical 
error” is ordinarily defined as “errors committed in the course of 
trial which would not have prejudiced a party and hence are not 
grounds for reversal.”146 Hence, the only findings of fact amenable 
to change are those that do not affect the substantive rights of a 
party. It is also clear that the legislature meant for the agency to be 
the ultimate decision-maker on pure issues of law and the 
construction of the meaning of the agency’s own statutes and 
rules.147 The statute expresses that the SOAH ALJ must “apply” the 
agency’s statutory interpretation or rule to the findings of underlying 
fact when making a decision.148  
This approach is consistent with the court’s judicial review 
approach of awarding substantial deference to agency’s interpretation 
of the law when challenged under substantial 
evidence judicial review.149 It is the state agency, not the ALJ, 
that is charged with the duty to consistently and uniformly interpret 
and apply the public policy of this state.150  
 
IV.  THE TEXAS ETHICS COMMISSION 
 
As its name denotes, the Texas Ethics Commission (“TEC”) 
administers and enforces the state’s ethics laws, including statutes 
that govern campaign finance, the conduct of state officers and 
                                                          
143 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. § 1 (West) (codified as amended at TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 2001. 058 (e)(1)-(3). (West 2008). 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 Black’s Law Dictionary, Pocket ed. (4th ed. 1996). 
147 TEX GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e)(1) (West 2013 ). 
148 Id. 
 
149 See e.g. State v P.U.C. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 190, 195-196 (Tex. 1994). 
150 See e.g. id. 
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employees, candidates for and holders of state and local elected 
offices, political committees, lobbyists and, to some extent, political 
parties. 151 Currently forty-one states have ethics commissions and 
most were established in the 1970s or earlier largely in reaction to the 
national Watergate scandal.152 While Texas laws were revised 
following Watergate and some homegrown scandals,153 Texas joined 
a second wave of state ethics commission creations when it was 
established by a state constitutional amendment on November 5, 
1991.154  
Texas history reveals a fickle affair between the state and its 
campaign finance and lobby laws, as the regulation of such state 
government actors had taken on many forms before the TEC’s 1991 
debut.155 In the early 1900s, for example, lobbying was considered to 
be a crime in Texas with a penalty ranging from a fine “not less than 
two hundred dollars nor more than two 
thousand dollars.”156 The first significant change occurred in 1937 
when the Texas House of Representatives adopted rules mandating 
that persons testifying before one of its legislative committees register 
                                                          
151 TEX. CONST. art. III, § 24a; See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§§571.061 (West 2013). 
152 See Kayla Crider and Jeffery Milyo, Do State Ethics 
Commissions Reduce Political Corruption? An Exploratory 
Investigation, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 717 (August 2013). 
153 See Sam Kinch, Jr., Sharpstown Stock-Fraud Scandal, TEX. ST. HIST. 
ASS’N, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mqs01 (last visited 
September 23, 2014) (discussing the infamous scandal involving state 
lawmakers who made “profitable quick-turnover bank-financed stock 
purchases in return for the passage of legislation desired by the financier”). 
154 Tex. S.J. Res. 8, 72d Leg., R.S., 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3520, 3520-21 
(amending the Constitution to create the Texas Ethics Commission); see Tex. 
Const. III, §24a (providing for the Texas Ethics Commission). 
 
155 For a general discussion of the state’s ethics laws history, see 
Ross Fischer and Jack Gullahorn, The Advent of State and Local Lobby 
Regulations and the Legal and Ethical Considerations for Attorneys. 3 
ST. MARY’S L.J.  32 (2013). 
156 Cf. Act to Define and Punish Lobbying, 30th Leg., R.S., ch.79, § 4, 
1907 Tex. Gen. Laws 162, 163 (providing a monetary fine and jail time for 
violation of lobbying statute) (repealed 1957). 
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and provide more information before testifying.157 The state did not 
repeal the criminalization of lobbying per se until some twenty years 
later.158 Following the Sharpstown scandal of 1971,159 the Legislature 
created the state’s first full lobby registration law, which established 
registration-triggering mechanisms based on direct communication, 
compensation and expenditures, as well as the enumeration of specific 
exceptions160 and disclosure requirements. 
Finally, and shortly after Lonnie “Bo” Pilgrim, an East Texas 
chicken magnate, waved $10,000 campaign contribution checks at 
eight state senators on the Senate Floor during a heated debate over 
the state’s workers’ compensation laws, Texas created the 
Commission.161 The objective of the legislation was to enable the 
Commission to eliminate opportunities for undue 
influence over elections and governmental actions; fully disclose 
information related to expenditures and contributions for elections 
and for petitioning (lobbying) the government; enhance the potential 
                                                          
157 Tex. H.R. Rule 7 §41, H.S.R. 9, 54th Leg., R.S., 1955 H.J. of Tex. 16, 
reprinted in Rule of the House, Texas Legislative Manual 175-76 (1955). 
158 Representation Before the Legislature Act, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch.9, 1957 
Tex. Gen. Laws 17, repealed by Lobby Control Act, 63d, Leg., R.S., ch. 422, 1973 
Tex. Gen. Laws 1096, repealed by Act of Sept. 1, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S. ch. 479, § 
224, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1652, 1719; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 
(1954) (holding that the federal Lobbying Regulation Act as constitutional but 
narrowing its scope). 
159 See Sam Kinch, Jr., Sharpstown Stock-Fraud Scandal, TEX. ST. HIST. 
ASS’N, (September 23, 2014) 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mqs01 (discussing 
the infamous scandal involving state lawmakers who made “profitable quick-
turnover bank-financed stock purchases in return for the passage of 
legislation desired by the financier”). Id. 
160 Lobby Control Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 422, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096, 
repealed by Act of Sept. 1, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 479, § 224, 1985 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 1652, 1719. 
 
161 See The 1990 Bum Steer Awards, TEXAS MONTHLY (January 1990), 
http://www.texasmonthly.com/content/1990-bum-steer-awards (reporting on 
Lonnie Pilgrim’s contributions). See generally Act of Jan. 1, 1992, 72d Leg., R.S., 
ch. 304, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1290 (chronicling amendments and expansions on 
then-existing lobby laws), amended by Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th Leg. R.S., 
ch.996, § 4.03, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4999 (current version at Gov’t §305.003 
(West 2012)). 
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for individual participation in electoral and governmental processes; 
and to ensure the public’s confidence and trust in its government.162  
 
A.  Constitutional Body and Appointment Process 
 
The TEC was carefully established to achieve bipartisan 
credibility.163 The state constitution provides that the agency shall 
consist of eight members.164 Four are appointed by the Governor as 
follows: one from each of the separate lists submitted by Senate 
Republicans, Senate Democrats, House Democrats and House 
Republicans.165 Two are appointed by the Lieutenant Governor as 
follows: one from each of the separate lists submitted by Senate 
Republicans and Senate Democrats.166 Lastly, two are appointed by 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives as follows: one from 
each of the separate lists submitted by House Republicans and House 
Democrats.167 In this way, the appointing authorities are 
constitutionally required to split their appointments between each 
political party so the Commission is at all times evenly divided 
between Republicans and Democrats.168  
 
B.  Duties and Delegation of Authority 
 
Although created in the Texas Constitution, other than setting 
legislative per diem pay and recommending legislative salaries,169 the 
                                                          
162 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 571.001 (West 2013). 
163 Texas Ethics Commission Sunset Final Report with Legislative Action, 
Agency at a Glance, 7 (July 2013) [hereinafter referred to as the “TEC Sunset 
Report”]. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 TEX. CONST. art. III, § 24a (1876). To reach this result, however, the 
state’s constitution does not use the words “Republican” and “Democrat”; it uses 
the neutral phrase “from each political party required by law to hold a primary,” 
which only describes two major parties. 
 
168 Texas Ethics Commission Sunset Final Report with Legislative Action, 
Agency at a Glance, 7 (July 2013). 
169 TEX. CONST. art. III, § 24a, cl. (e). 
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Constitution leaves the Commission’s primary duties to be prescribed 
by the Legislature.170  
The [Commission’s] major functions include: maintaining 
financial disclosure reports and making them available to the 
public;171 investigating ethics and campaign finance complaints172 
and assessing penalties when warranted;173 issuing advisory opinions 
interpreting laws under the agency’s jurisdiction [and specified 
criminal statutes];174 providing information and assistance to 
stakeholders to help them understand their obligations under 
campaign finance and ethics laws;175 and registering persons engaged 
in lobbying at the state level and requiring periodic lobby activity 
reports.176  
The agency shall enforce all non-penal or civil penalty laws under 
its jurisdiction.177 Violations of most statutes under the agency’s 
purview also entails potential criminal prosecution by appropriate 
prosecuting attorneys178depending on the character of the offense, 
and some authorize civil causes of action, that may result in liability 
to the state179 or certain competitors in the electoral process.180  
The lynch-pins of the government-integrity laws enforced by the 
Commission are Chapter 305 of the Texas Government Code 
Annotated, relating to the registration, regulation, and reporting of 
lobbyists181 and Title 15 of the Texas Election Code Annotated, 
                                                          
170 TEX. CONST. art. III, § 24a, cl. (d). 
171 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 571.001(32),; 571.0031; , 571.066 (West 
2013); See generally TEX. ELEC.TION CODE ANN. §254 (West 2013). 
172 See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§571. 121-571.142 (West 2013) (putting 
forth TEC “Complaint Procedures and Hearings” regulations). 
173 See Gov’t §§571.171-571-177 (referring TEC “Enforcement” regulations). 
174 See Gov’t § 571.091-571.098 (defining scope TEC “Advisory Opinions”). 
175 Id. §571. 071. 
176 TEC Sunset Report at 7; see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 571.001 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.). 
177 TEX. CODE GOV’T ANN. § 571.061 (West 2013); TEC Sunset Report at 8. 
178 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 571.171 (West, 2015).   
179 TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 254.232 (West, 2015) . 
180 Id. § 254.231. 
181 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. ch. 305 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. 
Sess.) (putting forth lobby regulations); TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. tit. 1, ch. 34 
(2014) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Regulation of Lobbyists) (providing further 
regulation). 
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regulating money used in elections. These statutes and their 
enforcement proceedings seek to create a fair, level playing field for 
those who pay others or make expenditures to petition the 
government for legislative action, establish rules to prevent and 
punish corruption and make the public aware of money used in 
political campaigns.182With these functions in mind, the Legislature 
has authorized the agency, subject to oversight,183 to receive and 
“investigate complaints, hold enforcement hearings, issue orders, 
impose civil penalties, refer issues for criminal prosecution, and take 
action against a lobbyist’s registration.”184 
Importantly, the agency may also issue advisory opinions about 
the laws under its jurisdiction185 and two chapters of the Penal Code, 
including laws against bribery and abuse of office.186 “The purpose of 
a TEC advisory opinion is not to make specified conduct illegal [but 
to] provide those who reasonably rely on the opinion a defense in an 
action to impose criminal or civil liability.”187 In order to satisfy the 
“reasonable reliance” requirement, the written opinion must “relat[e] 
to [(1)] the provision of the law the person is alleged to have violated 
or . . . (2) a fact situation substantially similar to the fact situation in 
which the person is involved.”188Since issuing its first opinion in 
1992, the Commission has issued approximately five hundred 
advisory opinions, and the number issued annually has remained 
                                                          
182 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §571.001 (West,2015) (defining the purpose of 
TEC as “protect[ing] the constitutional privilege of free suffrage by regulating 
elections and prohibiting undue influence while also protecting the constitutional 
right of the governed to apply to their government for redress of grievances.”). 
183 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 571.022 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. 
Sess.). 
184 TEC Sunset Report at 8. 
185 TEX. GOV. CODE ANN. § 571.061 (West, 2013). 
186 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 571.091 (West 2015). 
 
187 Tex. Ethics Comm’n v. Goodman, No. 2-09-094-CV, 2010 WL 323544 at 
*3 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010) (emphasis added); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
571.097 (West, 2015).  
188 Goodman, 2010 WL 323544 at *4; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
571.091 (West, 2015). (A legislator who reasonably relied on an advisory opinion 
of the Texas Ethics Commission was not liable for a $10,000 civil penalty for 
converting political contributions to personal use). 
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relatively consistent over time, ranging from “five to ten per year 
during the last decade”.189  
The TEC has the authority to employ its own staff, which 
typically averages between 33 to 36 staff positions, including 
attorneys.190 The “[C]ommission . . . may delegate [to staff] a[ny] 
power conferred on it . . . except for any power requiring a vote of 
the Commission; rulemaking authority; or the authority to issue 
advisory opinions.”191 The Commission, however, is not prohibited 
from using independent contractors “to carry out . . . [these] rules, 
standards or orders, . . . excluding any enforcement authority.”192  
 
C.  The TEC Sworn Complaint Process 
 
One of the most important enforcement authorities given to the 
agency is the ability to conduct a sworn complaint proceeding, which 
may become a contested case. “Unlike many state agencies with 
enforcement authority, the full . . . Commission is involved in 
developing proposed enforcement actions and sitting as final judge to 
take action on sworn complaints.”193  
 “Any Texas resident or real property owner can file a sworn 
complaint with the Commission alleging a violation of a law 
enforced by the agency194. . . .The process begins with the executive 
director determining whether the Commission has jurisdiction over 
the matter” addressed in the complaint.195 This entails determining 
whether the complaint meets the form requirements of the statute,196 
including a determination that the complaint states facts which if true 
would constitute a violation.197 
                                                          
189 TEC Sunset Report at 9. 
190 Id. at 8. 
191  Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 571.075 (West, 2015). 
192 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 571.075-076 (West,2015); see TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 571.075 (West 2015). 
193 See TEC Sunset Report at 2. 
 
194 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §571.122(a)(7)(b-1) (West, 2015). 
195 TEC Sunset Report at 19 
196 Id. §571.123 (West, 2015). 
197 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 571. 122(d) (West,2015). 
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If the alleged violation is minor, the executive director can simply 
ask the respondent (i.e, the person alleged by the complaint to have 
committed a violation) for “assurance of voluntary compliance.”198 In 
other words, a private reprimand. For more serious issues, the “TEC 
staff prepares a report for the full Commission for consideration with 
staff during a closed preliminary review.”199 During the preliminary 
review session, staff may seek more information, propose an “agreed 
order”, or resolve the complaint through “assurance of voluntary 
compliance.”200  
If the respondent refuses to sign an “agreed order” where it is 
deemed the appropriate action or refuses to cooperate at all, the 
Commission may elect to hold a closed preliminary review 
hearing.201 In preparation for this hearing, the Commission may 
subpoena necessary witnesses, including but not limited to the 
complainant (i.e., the person who submitted the sworn complaint) or 
any persons involved in preparing the complaint to attend the hearing 
for more fact- finding.202 However, the Commission is not required to 
subpoena such witnesses even upon request of the respondent.203 
The preliminary review hearing may result in resolving the 
complaint or dismissal due to insufficient evidence or no credible 
evidence of violation.204 But if the matter is not resolved, it will be 
taken up for consideration at a formal hearing, either because the 
Commission determines that there is credible evidence of a violation 
or because it determines there is insufficient credible evidence but 
desires to move to the formal hearing stage to engage the full 
discovery process.205  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
198 See TEC Sunset Report at 19. 
199 Id.; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 571.1242-571.1244 (West,2015). 
200 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§  571.1242(d), 1243 (West, 2015).  
201 Id. §§ 571.124-571.125(a). 
202 Id. 
203 Gov’t § 571.126 
204 Id. 
205 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN § 571.126(c) (West, 2015). 
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D.  The Formal Hearing Process 
 
A formal hearing to enforce a law under the Commission’s 
jurisdiction differs substantially from the typical SOAH case in that it 
is governed regarding various issues and procedures by the 
Commission’s enabling act,206 the APA,207 and the Texas Open 
Meetings Act.208There is no explicit requirement or authorization in 
the Commission’s enabling act for its formal cases to be heard by the 
State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH).209 Currently, 
Section 571.132(a), Government Code, implies that at least some 
Commission formal hearings may be done by SOAH.210 Also, 
SOAH’s enabling act provides that the agency “shall conduct all 
administrative hearings in contested cases under Chapter 2001 that 
are before a state agency that does not employ an individual whose 
only duty is to preside as a hearings officer over matters related to 
contested cases before the agency.”211 The Commission does not 
employ anyone whose sole job is to act as an administrative judge.212 
During its 2013 regular legislative session, the Texas Legislature 
passed a “sunset bill” (hereinafter the “sunset bill”), 213 for the TEC, 
which would make substantial changes to its contested case 
proceedings. However, the Governor subsequently vetoed the bill for 
unrelated issues.214 A sunset bill is legislation proposed to enact 
recommendations following extensive review by the Sunset Advisory 
Commission (hereinafter the SAC), an agency of the Legislature.215 
The SAC’s main function is to evaluate the effectiveness of a state 
agency based on whether its operations meet the respective agency’s 
mission and goals while also exercising fiscal prudence.216 The term 
                                                          
206 Id. §§ 571.129-571.135. 
207 Id. § 571.139(c). 
208 Id. § 571.139(b). 
209 See Id. 
210 Id. § 571.139(a). 
211 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2003.021(b)(1). 
212 Id. 
213 S.B.219, 83d Leg; S.Res (Tex. 2013). 
214 S.B.219, 83d Leg; S.Res (Tex. 2013) (veto message of Governor Perry). 
215 See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 325.00-325.023 (West,2015). 
216 Id. § 325.011. 
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“sunset” comes from the threat that if the legislation fails to become 
law, a statute will require its’ expiration.217  
The TEC sunset bill, in its enrolled version,218 recommended 
changes to the TEC’s treatment of contested cases by clarifying that 
the TEC has the authority (but is not required) to transfer cases to 
SOAH. Thus, limiting the involvement of the TEC’s commissioners 
in its preliminary hearing process. The bill, for most of its legislative 
existence, also contained a provision to repeal the historical standard 
of judicial review of TEC’s contested cases; which is de novo.219 
However, that provision was later removed on the House floor 
despite being approved by the entire Texas Senate and included in 
the House Committee version of the bill.220  
In apparent response to a recommendation of the SAC, the TEC 
adopted an administrative “venue” rule that provides for its formal 
cases to be heard by SOAH or the Commissioners themselves, at the 
option of the agency.221 For further clarification, the Sunset 
legislation, if enacted, would have expressly authorized the 
Commission to send its contested cases to SOAH.222  Generally, a 
state agency may choose to add it owns rules regarding procedure 
and evidence. 223 Therefore, in order to fully ascertain the rules 
governing the process of proof at a TEC contested case hearing, it is 
necessary to examine the APA, the TEC’s enabling statutes, and the 
relevant agency rules.224 While the Commission is directed by statute 
to “adopt rules governing discovery, hearings, and related 
                                                          
217 Id. § 325.017; But see Tex. CONST. ART. III, § 24(a) (reasoning that the 
TEC is a constitutional body. Therefore, failure of its sunset legislation alone could 
not end its existence). 
218 TEC Sunset Report supra note 164. 
219 Id. 
220 See S.B. 219, Conf. Comm Rep., Section by 
Section Analysis (Tex. 2013) 
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/83ccrs/sb0219.pdf#nav
panes=0. 
221 TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1, § 12.117 (2013). 
222  House Report; supra note 77, at 13. 
223 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e)(1)-(3), TEC Sunset Report supra 
note 164 at 22. 
224 See Id. 
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procedures,”225 critics say it has never complied with the full scope of 
this statutory duty.226 The Sunset Bill directed the Commission to 
promulgate rules for these matters in order to avoid any ambiguities 
in the process.227 
In accordance with the APA, the Commissioners are prohibited 
from engaging in any ex parte communication with the respondent, a 
witness, or party to the complaint.228 Additionally, the agency is 
authorized to carry out certain civil procedures229 such as issuing 
subpoenas to necessary witnesses or documents and examining 
witnesses that directly relate to a sworn  
complaint.230  If a person to whom a subpoena is directed refuses 
to appear, refuse to answer inquiries, or fail or refuses to produce 
books, records, or other documents that are under the person’s 
control when the demand is made, the Commission has the authority 
to report that fact to a district court in Travis County.231 The district 
court can enforce the subpoena by attachment proceedings for 
contempt in the same manner as the court enforces a subpoena issued 
by the court.232 Also, if a respondent refuses to answer any questions 
before the Commission at the formal hearing, the Commission is 
permitted to draw inferences adverse to the respondent that support 
the allegations in the sworn complaint.233  
                                                          
225 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 571.131(c) (West 1993). 
226 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §12.13 (representation by counsel), §12.15 
(appearance of complainant), §12.21 (Notice), 12.23 (hearing in respondent’s 
absence), §12.25 (waiver of hearing), §12.27 (deadline extension), §12.29 
(subpoenas), §12.117 (venue), §12.119 (dismissal where evidence is 
insufficient)(West 2015). 
227 S.B.219, 83d Leg; S.Res (Tex. 2013). 
228 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 200.061(a) (West 2013). 
229 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.091 (West 2013). 
230 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J., supra note 106, at 17; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN § 
2001.001(1); see also supra text accompanying note 106. 
231 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 571.137(a) (West 2003),§ 2001.201 (West 
1993). 
232 See generally Pelt v. State Bd. of Ins., 802 S.W.2d 822, 827, Sinclair v. 
Sav. & Loan Comm’r of Tex., 696 S.W.2d 142. 
233 In re Michael Quinn Sullivan, Texas Ethics Commission Final 
Order, (hereinafter referred to as “The Order”), see Andrews v. Texas 
Department of Health, 2007 WL 486488 (provides example of how this 
presumption is applied in administration proceedings).  
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If the Commission finds that a violation within the jurisdiction of 
the Commission has occurred, it may impose a civil fine of no more 
than five thousand dollars or three times the “amount at issue”, 
whichever is greater234 It may also issue a “cease and desist” letter or 
refer the matter for criminal prosecution. 235 
The TEC process is unusual for Texas state agencies. At other 
Texas state agencies, the process typically starts with developing an 
agreed order without the full governing board; if, after investigation, 
the staff believes that grounds exist for enforcement action.236There 
may even be informal discussions with the respondent and a subset of 
agency board members. 237 However, if the matter is not resolved 
beyond this point, the state agency most likely sends the contested 
case to SOAH for a formal hearing.238  
Some critics of the TEC process have noted that because the 
Commission is involved from start to finish, the Commission may be 
biased by the time the matter reaches a formal hearing.239 The agency 
may be partial to a particular set of facts it developed without hearing 
all sides; resulting in unfair decision-making. The sunset legislation 
acknowledged these concerns by proposing to eliminate any 
Commissioner’s involvement in the preliminary review of a sworn 
complaint and reducing the number of Commissioners involved in 
the preliminary review hearing.240 Until the Sunset bill reached the 
House floor, the legislation also proposed to repeal the statute 
requiring de novo review in favor of the substantial evidence rule.241 
This particular proposal would have greatly altered the way in which 
courts currently review the agency’s final orders in contested cases 
and strengthened the agency’s hand in enforcing state ethics laws.242  
 
 
                                                          
234 The Order. 
235 Id. 
236 See generally, FISCHER & GULLAHORN, supra note 156 at 23.  
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239See generally Crider and Milyo, supra note 153 at 23. Texas Public Ethics 
Legislation: A Proposed Statute, 50 TEX. L. REV. 931, 967 (1972). 
240 TEC Sunset Report, supra note 164, at 25. 
241 Conf. Comm Rep. , Section by Section Analysis. supra at note, 219 at 32. 
242 Id. 
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E.  Judicial Review of TEC Formal Hearing Decisions 
 
A respondent who wishes to appeal a decision made by the TEC 
is able to do so in a Travis County district court or where the 
respondent resides.243 The court that reviews the appeal de novo, is 
required to try all issues of fact and law in the manner applicable to 
other civil suits in the state and may not admit into evidence the fact 
of prior action by the commission or the nature of that action, except 
for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction.244  
In essence, the phrase de novo judicial review is a misnomer. 
There is no review of the agency’s action since the process began, 
and the agency’s decision is vacated.245 A party 
may even demand a jury trial, which is virtually unheard of in 
administrative proceedings.246 This judicial review standard is 
recognized in both the APA and the agency’s enabling statutes.247  
Texas lawmakers have continuously preferred de novo judicial 
review for the TEC.248 This preference does not seem to be a partisan 
issue. In the most recent legislative session, two state representatives 
from completely opposite sides of the political spectrum engaged in a 
colloquy before offering an amendment, which affirmed the use of de 
novo judicial review, rather than substantial evidence review, for 
TEC contested case decisions. 249 Both lawmakers expressed concern 
                                                          
243 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 571.133(a) (West, 2013). 
244 See id. §571.133(d), Empower Texans, Inc., v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n., 2014 
WL 1366442 (Westlaw). 
245 See Southwestern Bell Tel. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 571 S.W.2d 503 at 509 
(Tex. 1978). 
246 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(b), see generally Atlas Roofing Co. v. 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (holding 
that a civil jury trial was not 
available to a company that was fined by Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission). 
247 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§2001.173(b), 571.133(d) (West, 2013). 
248 Pete Schenkkan, Texas Administrative Law: Trials, Triumphs, and New 
Challenges, 7 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 287, 300 (2006). 
249 Summary of Enacted Bills, 84th Legislative Session by Texas Ethics 
Commission,(September 9, 2015). 
https://www.ethics.state.tx.us/whatsnew/leg2015.html  
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about “abridging an individual’s right to a trial by jury”250 where 
First Amendment rights are at stake.251One lawmaker even 
acknowledged that de novo review would “make it harder” on the 
TEC to enforce its decisions, but it is worth the cost to the agency 
when considering Free Speech rights.252 He also expressed concern 
over ending a person’s “political career” due to a serious alleged 
ethics violation and never having a fair day in court to rebut the 
decision.253 Yet, the legislature has repeatedly approved substantial 
evidence review for courts to follow when reviewing other agencies’ 
decisions.254  It would be difficult to imagine that a contested case 
decision from one of these agencies has not been the cause of ending 
a person’s career. Moreover, the legislation directed the TEC to 
create precise rules for conducting its contested case hearings and 
limited the Commissioner’s involvement until the formal hearing in 
order to ensure more due process for affected parties. These changes, 
even taken as a whole, were not enough to persuade the legislature to 
repeal de novo judicial review for this agency.255  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
It is important to remember that other state agencies regulate 
occupations and handle property rights issues.256 These decisions are 
as important to the affected parties as the decisions of the TEC are to 
the politicians and lobbyists it regulates. Most agency decisions, 
however, are reviewed using the substantial evidence rule.257 If a 
person has been injured by any agency’s contested case decision, that 
person would most likely choose de novo over substantial evidence 
review for their appeal—if given the choice. No reasonable person 
                                                          
250 See videotape: Chamber Session (Texas House of Representatives March 30, 
2013) (on file with Granicus) beginning at 3:32:00 
http://tlchouse.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=20&clip_id=5123. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Schenkkan, supra note 16  
255 Id. 
256  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e)(1)-(3). 
257 See generally Crider and Milyo supra note 153 at 23. Texas Public Ethics 
Legislation: A Proposed Statute, 50 TEX. L. REV. 931, 967 (1972). 
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would want to compete with the deferential standard given to a 
regulatory agency from the very outset of the case. The questions 
become: are the interests of politicians and lobbyists more important 
than the rights of someone who has been adversely affected by 
another agency’s decisions; if the application of the substantial 
evidence rule can be explained by a preference for efficiency in the 
use of administrative and judicial resources; if so, why would the 
same efficiency not be preferred in cases involving participants in the 
political process; and is it that lawmakers prefer the protection of de 
novo review versus substantial evidence review? 
There is no reason to believe that the United States Constitution 
explicitly requires de novo review of an agency decision affecting 
First Amendment rights. Assuming an agency’s procedures are 
sufficiently defined by its statutes and rules to provide fair notice and 
an opportunity for a hearing before an unbiased finder of fact with 
some level of judicial review, due process should be sufficiently 
served. On the other hand, it is certainly within the prerogative of the 
legislature to balance protection of First Amendment activities with 
the public’s interest in preventing corruption and having knowledge 
about government functioning and elections in favor of the former by 
concluding that de novo review is justified for TEC contested cases. 
If the TEC’s contested case proceedings are to be brought under 
the substantial evidence rule—that is, if the agency’s power is to be 
strengthened, its decisions given greater deference and greater 
efficiency promoted— there must be additional changes in the way its 
cases are handled. Those changes should start with the Sunset 
recommendation of the agency adopt more detailed procedural rules 
and that TEC commissioners be removed from the early stages of 
complaint resolution in order to ensure an unbiased tribunal at the 
formal hearing stage. In addition, the agency needs to actively pursue 
more robust discovery in preparation for the formal hearing so that an 
adequate record can be made prior to decision and review. Those 
changes could be made, to some extent, by simply moving the process 
to SOAH and deferring to SOAH’s procedural rules. This should be 
done consistently and not on a case-by-case basis. 
Without these important changes, de novo review is entirely 
appropriate. The current system, although it affords due process, is 
not as tightly structured, as one would expect if the Sunset 
recommendations had been adopted. In addition, the combination of 
the APA’s relaxed application of the rules of evidence and civil 
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procedure with the TEC’s less structured approach, argues for 
courtroom treatment regarding contested cases that seek to resolve 
important issues about how our political system should function. 
Therefore, an affected party who truly believes he has adhered to 
state law on these issues should be unafraid to face a more strict 
application of evidence and procedural rules, such as the substantial 
discovery demands necessary to ascertain the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
Favoring de novo review sets forth the importance of the rights 
and interests involved to the very fabric of governmental functioning; 
while balancing presently absent detailed procedural reforms. It may 
be a less efficient use of administrative and judicial resources; 
however, is necessary in the absence of a consensus among 
lawmakers to strengthen the TEC’s enforcement of our state’s ethics 
laws. 
 
